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Articles
PITTMAN V.ATLANTIC REALTr: AFFIDAVITS AND THE SEARCH FOR THE
GENUINE DISPUTE OF MATERIAL FACT

by Gwen B. Tromleyz
I. INTRODUCTION

Scheduling orders, the discovery process and
summary judgment: these are among the key elements of
Maryland's structured system ofcivil litigation. Generally,
these elements operate in a sequenced fashion to propel
cases toward resolution. However, when litigation does
not proceed according to the intended paradigm, a case
may reach the court-ordered summary judgment phase
before all of the material facts have been revealed. In this
article, I will discuss the Pittman case, Maryland
procedure, and the sham affidavit rule of federal caselaw. 3
I also will suggest a change in the Maryland Rules.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, how
should a trial court treat affidavit:s4 submitted in opposition

I

359Md. 513, 754A.2d 1030 (2000).

2

Ms. Trom1ey is an Assistant Solicitor in the Baltimore City
Department of Law. The opinions expressed in this article are
solely those of the author, and are not those of the Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, the Baltimore City Solicitor, or of
the Baltimore City Department of Law.

to the motion that squarely contradict5 prior deposition
testimony? May a trial court strike these affidavits when
their factual content varies from what the nonmoving party
previously has furnished in discovery and the deadline for
discovery under the trial court's scheduling order has
passed? Federal and state courts considering these issues
have adopted a range of approaches; the Supreme Court
has yet to consider the issue. Recently, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland addressed these questions in
Pittman v. Atlantic Realty,6 an opinion that underscores
the dilemma confronting trial courts and parties engaged
in the determination ofwhether, for purposes of summary
judgment, there exists a genuine dispute ofmaterial fact. 7
In this lead paint poisoning case, Defendant, Atlantic
Realty ("Atlantic"), had deposed three ofPlaintiffs ' 8 chief
witnesses9 a full year before Atlantic moved for summary
judgment in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. In
opposition to the motion, Plaintiffs submitted affidavits from
these three witnesses, asserting facts that differed
substantially from those claimed in the affiants' prior
deposition testimony. Plaintiffs relied on these new facts,
enlarging the dates and length of time the minorTerran
had visited or resided at Atlantic's property, as the basis
upon which to present a revised and, now, favorable

3

As discussed more fully below, this term is a reference to a
rule of federal caselaw, pursuant to which a court may
disregard an affidavit on the grounds that it is a "sham" that
fails to raise a genuine dispute of material fact, if the affiant
has personal knowledge of the facts but cannot explain a
material contradiction between the party's deposition
testimony and that party's subsequent affidavit. 359 Md. at
529, 754 A.2d at 1038.

5

359Md. at527, 754A.2dat 1037.

6

/d. at517, 754 A.2dat 1032.

7

See Md. Rule 2-50l(a), (b) and (e).

8
4

For the purpose of this Note, I will refer to affidavits
submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment
that contradict prior deposition testimony, as "affidavits."
Another commentator has termed them "offsetting affidavits."
See Collin J. Cox, Reconsidering the Sham Affidavit
Doctrine, 50 DUKE L. J. 261, 262 (2000).

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 30

Plaintiff Shari Hall ("Hall") brought suit on behalf of herself
and her minor son, Terran Pittman ("Terran"), who is alleged
to have sustained lead poisoning as the result of exposure at
Atlantic's property.
9

These witnesses were Plaintiff Shari Hall, her mother,
Gladys Hall, and the Plaintiffs' medical expert.
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medical expert opinion.
After granting Atlantic's motion to strike Plaintiff's
affidavits on the grounds that they were "sham affidavits,"
the trial court entered summary judgment for Atlantic on
the remaining evidence before the court. 10 The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland, adopting the federal
sham affidavit rule, affirmed the holding of the trial
court. 11 The Court ofAppeals of Maryland reversed. 12
Declining to apply the sham affidavit rule, the court
of appeals held that the circuit court had erred in
striking Plaintiffs' affidavits because the act of striking
them had required the trial court to engage improperly
in credibility determinations. 13 The court remanded
the case with instructions and the case is now set for
trial in the fall of2001. 14
At first reading, the result in this case may seem unjust.
The three dissenting members of the court expressed the
view that under the circumstances of this case the trial
court had the discretion to strike the affidavits. 15 Although
the opinion exhibits a scholarly analysis of the rules

10

359 Md. at 524-25, 754 A.2d at I 035-36.

II

I27 Md. App. 255,732 A.2d 9I2 (I999).

12

359 Md. at 5I7, 754 A.2d at 1032.

13

The Court said: "The sham affidavit rule is contrary to the
way in which this Courts rule on summary judgment
traditionally has been applied, because, in application, the
sham affidavit rule requires a credibility judgment by the
trial court." Jd. at 534,754 A.2d at 1041 (emphasis added).

governing discovery, summary judgment, scheduling
orders, and the cases that interpret these rules, it also
exposes the policy problems that exist under the Rules ,
as currently drafted.
Should a party who has undertaken and provided
full discovery be subjected to learning, only upon filing for
summary judgment, that the factual basis ofthe opposing
party's claim has changed in a fundamental way? Why
should a party be expected to devote its financial and other
resources to litigating a case in accordance with the Rules,
only to find that the other side does not appear to be
following the same rules? One must ask why, if the facts
of the case are as stated in the affidavit in opposition to
summary judgment, such facts were not disclosed during
the court-ordered discovery phase of the litigation, in
Plaintiffs' answers to interrogatories or in deposition, when
the questions posed would necessarily have elicited the
facts later asserted.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Terran Pittman was born in December 1990. 16 In
1992, he was diagnosed as having an elevated blood lead
level. 17 In 1994, Hall filed suit against Atlantic Realty on
behalf of herself and her son, alleging that Terran had
sustained injuries as a result of exposure to lead paint on
Atlantic's property. 18 In March 1995, the trial court issued
its scheduling order, mandating that discovery in the case
be completed by March 1996. 19 The order required the
parties to conclude expert depositions and further
supplementation of discovery by March 1998.20
As discovery in the case progressed in accordance
with the court's scheduling order, Hall answered Atlantic's

14
See Case No. 24-C-94-I7304I, Pre-Trial Scheduling
Order, October I7, 2000.

16

!d. at 517, 754 A.2d at I032.

17

!d.

15

Writing for the dissent, Judge Wilner described the "sham
affidavit" rule as a "reasonable and useful approach to
protecting both the summary judgment procedure and our case
management system against blatant fraud. I would hold, in this
case, that the trial court had discretion to strike the two
affidavits submitted in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, that it did not abuse its discretion in so doing, and
that, on the remaining record presented to the court for
purposes of the motion, it did not err in granting the motion."
359 Md. at 553, 754 A.2d at I 05I. (Wilner, J., dissenting).

18

Although Hall also sued the Housing Authority of
Baltimore City ("HABC"), that defendant has been dismissed
from the case without prejudice.Jd. at 5I7, 754 A.2d at I 032.
19

!d. at 518, 754 A.2d at I 032.

20

!d.
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interrogatories and was later deposed by Atlantic's
counsel. In answers to interrogatories, Hall stated that
she and Terran had moved onto Atlantic's property in
"approximately the spring/summer of 1992."21 She
described the period of their residence at the property as
"1992-1993."22 Without specifying a time frame, Hall
stated that Terran had been cared for at Atlantic's property
from "8:00a.m. to 4:00p.m. Monday through Friday."23
Hall's deposition testimony, concerning the length
of Plaintiffs' residence and visits at Atlantic's property,
was "vague, confused and inconsistent."24 Hall told
deposing counsel that two months was the "maximum"
period that she had lived at Atlantic's property, 25 and
that Terran had visited the property "twice a week
before residing there and three to four times a week
for up to three hours at a time after residing there." 26
In his deposition testimony, Plaintiffs' medical expert
opined that a two-month exposure to lead during residence
at Atlantic's property was not sufficient to constitute a
"'substantial factor' in causingTerran's injuries."27 Lacking
a time frame for Terran 's visits, the doctor could not state
with a reasonable degree of medical probability that
exposure to lead at Atlantic's property was a "major
contributor" to Terran 's injuries. 28
Subsequently, in April 1998, Atlantic moved for
summary judgment relying on the testimony ofPlaintiffs'

medical expert that he could not render an opinion
concerning "substantial factor causation." 29 In
response, Plaintiffs filed the three affidavits that gave
rise to the dispute in this case. Granting Atlantic's
motion to strike the affidavits, the trial court observed,
"'[t]he process of discovery can become subverted ..
. if by the mere presentation of an affidavit constructed
more than a year after the presentation of deposition
testimony, a witness can so dramatically alter her
evidence."30 In the absence of the stricken affidavits,
Plaintiffs could not meet their burden of establishing
that exposure to lead at Atlantic's property was a
substantial factor in causing Terran's injuries. 31 With
the case in this posture, the trial court entered summary
judgment in favor of Atlantic. 32

III. DISCUSSION
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland,
describing the affidavits as creating unfair surprise,
characterized them as containing information that
contradicted Hall's interrogatory answers and her
deposition testimony. 33 The court further observed that
the affidavits, lengthening the child's residence on Atlantic's
property to five and one half years, were not filed within
the discovery deadline. 34 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari in order to determine whether
to adopt the sham affidavit rule of federal case law. 35
Before the court of appeals, Plaintiffs contended that
application of the sham affidavit rule violates Maryland
law prohibiting trial courts from engaging in credibility

21

/d. at519, 754A.2dat 1033.

22

!d.

23

/d.

29

/d. at 523, 754 A.2d at 1035.

24

/d.

30

/d. at 525, 754 A.2d at 1036.

25

/d. at 520, 754 A.2d at 1033.

31

!d.

/d. at 521, 754 A.2d at 1034. The Court summarized Hall's
testimony in this manner, noting that the testimony would be
viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff-Petitioners.

32

/d. at524, 754A.2dat 1036.

33

/d. at525-26, 754A.2dat 1036-37.

27

/d. at523, 754A.2dat 1035.

34

!d.

28

/d. at 522-523, 754 A.2d at 1035.

35

!d. at526, 754A.2dat 1037.

26

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 32
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determinations on review of motions for summary
judgment, that Ru1e 2-501 authorizes the filing ofaffidavits
in opposition to summary judgment motions and that
Plaintiffs' affidavits merely "supplement and clarify"
their prior discovery responses. 36 Atlantic Realty
countered that the sham affidavit rule is consistent with
standard summary judgment procedure, that deposition
testimony is "inherently more reliable than affidavits,"
and that the rule preserves the "integrity of scheduling
orders." 37 Because the court of appeals provided
straightforward guidance regarding the affidavit
practices that it will uphold in the summary judgment
context, the impact of the court's opinion is not limited
to parties in lead paint cases.
The opinion highlights five issues ofcontinuing interest
to trial judges and litigators. First, the court reiterated the
well-established rule that, in reviewing a motion for
summary judgment, a court may not engage in credibility
determinations. 38 Next, the court held that Maryland does
not adopt the sham affidavit rule presently applied in
most federal courts. 39 Third, the court outlined the
circumstances under which Maryland courts presently are
authorized to disregard the otherwise admissible content
of an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary
judgment.40 Fourth, the court clarified that neither the rule
governing scheduling orders41 nor the scheduling order
itsel:f'2 deprive the non-moving party ofthe right to submit
an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment. 43 Finally, the court offered alternative
approaches for dealing with summary judgment affidavits
where the factual content varies substantially from
information furnished previously in discovery,
observing that sanctions and other remedies are
available against parties who submit such affidavits
in bad faith in order to avoid the entry of summary
judgment. 44

A. Summary Judgment
Neither the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, nor
the Maryland Rules, address the issue of how a court
should treat affidavits that contradict prior deposition
testimony. 45 Federal Ru1e 56 authorizes the court to grant
summary judgment, "ifthe pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw."46 Similarly, Maryland's
summary judgment rule provides that "[t]he court shall
enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if
the motion and response show that there is no genuine
dispute of material fact and that the party in whose favor
judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law."47
As noted by the dissent in Pittman, 48 federal practice

44

36

!d.

37

!d.

38

/d. at 534, 754 A.2d at 1041.

39

!d. at 539, 754 A.2d at 1044.

40

!d.

41

See Rule 2-504.

!d. at 542-43, 754 A.2d at 1046.

45

!d. at 527,754 A.2d at 1037. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides for the required form of affidavits,
circumstances in which affidavits are unavailable, and
affidavits made in bad faith. Maryland Rule 2-501 imposes
minimum requirements for affidavits supporting or opposing a
motion for summary judgment, including that they be made
upon personal knowledge, set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters set forth in the affidavit.
46

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c).

The Scheduling Order in this case required completion of all
discovery, including supplementation, by March 1998.

47

Rule 2-501 (e).

43

48

!d. at 555,359 Md. at 555,754 A.2dat 1052-53.

42

359 Md. at 534, 754 A.2d at I041.
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and interpretation have nearly always been treated as
persuasive because Maryland's summary judgment rule
was derived from the Federal Rule. Nevertheless, one
distinct difference between the state and federal rules is
meaningful in the analysis of this case. Unlike the
Federal Rule, Maryland's Rule does not include a
provision authorizing a trial court to sanction a party
who presents an affidavit in bad faith. 49 Thus, while
the rules are substantially similar, this difference may
have helped produce the result in this case.
As in any negligence case, in order to establish a
cause of action in a lead paint poisoning case, a party
must show that: ( 1) the defendant was under a duty to
protect the plaintifffrom injruy; (2) the defendant breached
that duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered actual loss or injury;
and (4) the loss or injury proximately resulted from the
defendant's breach of duty. 50 Moreover, to survive a
motion for summary judgment in a lead paint case, the
plaintiff must present evidence establishing that: ( 1) the
landlord knew or had reason to know of a condition on
the premises that posed an unreasonable risk of physical
harm to persons in the premises, and (2) the landlord
should have realized the risk oflead poisoning. 51 Further,

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (g) authorizes the court to impose sanctions
against a party who has submitted an affidavit "in bad faith or
solely for the purpose of delay." Interestingly, Maryland's
summary judgment rule, codified then as Rule 610, previously
has included a bad faith provision. However, as noted by
Professor Brown, the former rule did not authorize the court to
hold the "offending party" or counsel in contempt or to order
an "offending attorney" rather than the party, to pay the
expenses incurred by the bad faith conduct. See Brown,
Summary Judgment in Maryland, 38 MD. L. REV. 188, 219
(1978), Copyright 1979 by C. Christopher Brown. All rights
reserved.

the plaintiffbears the burden to prove specifically that
a "'defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in
causing the plaintiff's injuries."'52 Clearly, evidence
tending to prove the amount of time that Terran had
spent at Atlantic's property was essential to the viability
of Plaintiffs' claim.
In this case, when faced with the motion for summary
judgment, Plaintiffs changed the position they advanced in
prior discovery. 53 Without the post-deposition affidavits
at issue in this case, Plaintiffs could not sustain their burden
to prove that exposure on Atlantic's property was a
"substantial factor" in causing Terran 's injuries. 54
The rudiments of summary judgment are well settled.
To defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving
party must show that there is a genuine dispute ofmaterial
fact by proffering facts that would be admissible in
evidence. 55 Generalized allegations that do not show facts
in detail and with precision are insufficient to prevent
summary judgment.56 The "mere existence ofa scintilla of
evidence in support ofthe plaintiff's claim is insufficient to
preclude summary judgment; there must be evidence upon
which the jruy could reasonably find for the plaintiff."57
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the
court does not decide matters of credibility, 58 and must

49

53

Jd. at 523, 754 A.2d at 1035.

54

!d. at 524, 754 A.2d at 1036.

55

Beatty v. Trailmaster Products, 330 Md. 726, 73 7, 625 A.2d
1005, 1011 (1993) (expert's affidavit did not provide admissible
evidence creating genuine issue of material fact).
56

!d. at 738, 625 A.2d at 1011.

57
50

Richwind Joint Venture 4 v. Brunson, 335 Md. 661, 670, 645
A.2d 1147, 1151 ( 1994), Bartholomee v. Casey, I 03 Md. App. 34,
56-57' 651 A.2d 908, 918 ( 1994).

!d. at 738-739, 625A.2d at 1011 (citing Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,252 (1986)).
58

51

Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 361-62, 744 A.2d 47, 57
(2000). See also, Jones v. Mid-Atlantic Funding, 362 Md. 661,
766 A.2d617 (2001).

359 Md. at 537, 754A.2d at 1043 (citing Frush v. Brooks. 204
Md. 315,321, 104A.2d624, 626 (1954); Goodwich v. Sinai
Hospital ofBaltimore, Inc., 343 Md. 185,206,680 A. 2d 1067,
1077-78 (1996);Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,249
(1986)).

52

59

359Md.at521 n.4, 754A.2dat 1034(citingBartholomeev.
Casey, 103 Md.App. 34,56-57,651 A.2d 908,918 (1994)).

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 34

330 Md. at 739,625 A.2d at 1011 (citingClea v. City of
Baltimore, 312 Md. 662,678,541 A. 2d 1303, 1311 (1988)).
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resolve all reasonable inferences in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment.59 How, then, does a court
determine the genuineness of an asserted factual dispute if
it is not permitted to examine the circumstances under
which a non-movant's affidavit is submitted? Does a trial
court's analysis in determining the "genuineness" of
an asserted factual dispute necessarily involve a
credibility determination? If not, how does a court
determine whether an asserted factual dispute is,
indeed, "genuine" without invading the jury's province
to determine credibility, usurping its role as factfinder?
In construing the Maryland Rules, the court relies
upon principles similar to those used to interpret statutes,
looking first to the text ofthe Rule and giving its words
their ordinary meaning.60 If the words are unambiguous,
the inquiry ends. 61 The term "genuine" has been defmed
as: "1. possessing the alleged or apparent attribute or
character; 2. not spurious or counterfeit; authentic; 3 .a.
honestly felt or experienced; b. actual; real; 4. free from
hypocrisy or dishonesty; sincere. ''62
Although there does not appear to be any ambiguity
as to the meaning ofthe word "genuine," it is also useful to
consider the history of the summary judgment rule, first
adopted in 1947 as section IV of the Law and Equity
Rules of the General Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Maryland Code (1939, 1947 Cum. Supp.), at 2044. 63
The Rules Committee Reporter's explanatory notes at that
time described the purpose of the Rule:
The court does not, of course attempt to decide
any issue offact or ofcredibility, but only whether
such issues exist. If the affidavits or other

evidence show a genuine conflict, the court
must deny the motion. Thus, the proposed
procedure is not a substitute for a trial, but
only a hearing to decide whether a trial is
necessary. But the party opposing the motion
must show by facts that there is a real
dispute. 64
A similar purpose is reflected in Maryland Rule l201(a), which provides that, "These rules shall be
construed to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration, and elimination ofunjustifiable expense
and delay. 65
With this perspective in mind, it is helpful to examine
the method by which the court ruling on a motion for
summary judgment determines whether there exists a
genuine dispute of material fact. Describing the test for
this detenninationas ''highly analogous" to whether amotion
for judgment should be granted in a case tried to a jury,66
the court explained that to prevent the entry of summary
judgment, the non-moving party must present "such
evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff. " 67 In other words, "the evidence presented
by the nonrnovant68 must be such as 'would allow a
reasonable factfinder to conclude' that, in actuality, the

64

Id. at 537,754 A.2d at 1043.

65

MD. RULE PROC. §l-20l(a)(2000)(Emphasisadded).

66

359 Md. at 537,754 A.2dat 1043.

67

!d. at 537-38, 754A.2d at 1043 (citing Beatty v. Trailmaster
Prods., Inc., 330 Md. at 739,625 A.2d at 1011-12).
60

Wilson v. NBS, Inc., 130 Md. App. 430, 746A.2d 966 (2000).
(trial court had inherent authority, although not rule-based
authority, to dismiss minor lead paint plaintiff's cause of action
for failure to comply with order for examination).
61

Id. at441, 746A.2dat971.

62

The American Heritage College Dictionary, Third Edition,
1997.

63

359Md. at537, 754A.2dat 1042-43.

68

Maryland's summary judgment rule authorizes the court to
enter judgment in favor of or against the moving party if the
motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is
entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
69

359 Md. at 538,754 A.2d at 1043 (citing Chesapeake Pub.
Corp. v. Williams, 339 Md. 285,299,661 A.2d 1169, 1176 (1995),
Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Richard F. Kline, Inc., 91 Md. App. 236,
245,603 A.2d 1357, 1361 (1992)).
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facts were those most favorable to the nonmovant." 69

the prior evidence given by the respective
witnesses. 72

The Sham Affidavit Rule
In Pittman, the court of appeals' description of the
Plaintiffs' affidavits illustrates the dilemma facing the trial
court considering the motion for summary judgment
and Plaintiffs' opposition:
These affidavits were signed on May 7, 1998,
and filed the next day in court, more than one
year after Hall's deposition and almost two
months past the scheduling order's deadline for
concluding all supplementation ofdiscovery and
all expert discovery. Gladys Hall .. .in her
affidavit. ... tripled or quadrupled the 'couple of
months' to which she had testified on
deposition. 70

***
Furnished with the then stationary factual
platform of five and one-halfmonths residence,
plus over three years of visiting 'on an every
day basis' for seven to eight hours a day, Dr.
Klein, expressly assuming the truth ofthe new
affidavits, opined in his May 7 affidavit that
exposure at the subject premises was a
substantial causal factor in Terran's lead
poisoning. 71

The Second Circuit was frrst73 to consider the issue
of a trial court's treatment of an affidavit submitted in
response to a motion for summary judgment in the
case of Perma Research & Development Co. v. Singer
Co. 74 Perma filed suit against Singer alleging that
Singer did not intend to perform the parties' contract
for certain product assembly services. 75 In his
deposition, Perma's president failed to specify the facts
evidencing Singer's alleged fraud, and even
acknowledged that the two companies had been
working together to resolve problems in the product until
Singer stopped performing.76 Nevertheless, when Singer
moved for summary judgment, Perma's president
submitted an affidavit in opposition, claiming that one of
Singer's agents had told him that Singer never intended to
perform. 77
After the district court granted summary judgment,
the Second Circuit affirmed on grounds characterized by
the Pittman court as "the reliability, utility, and fairness
rationales."78 The Perma court reasoned that the district
court properly could have concluded that deposition
testimony, having been subjected to cross-examination,
was more reliable than an affidavit. 79 Moreover, the court
contended, disregarding a contradictory affidavit preserved
the utility ofthe summary judgment process as a device to

***
Neither the Hall nor the Gladys Hall affidavits
presented any explanation for the variances from

74

410 F.2d 572 (2d. Cir. 1969).

75

!d. at 574.

76

359 Md. at 513,527, 754A.2dat 1037 (citing Perma, 410 F. 2d
at576).
70

359 Md. at 523, 754 A.2d at 1035.

77

!d. (citing Perma, 410 F.2d at 577).

71

Id. at 524, 754 A.2d at 1036.

78

359 Md. at 529, 754 A.2d at 1038.

72

!d.

79

!d. at 528, 754 A.2d at 1038.

73

!d. at 527, 754 A.2d at 1037.

80

!d.

31.1 U. Bait L.F. 36

Articles
eliminate sham claims. 80 In sum, the "Perma rule"
stands for the proposition that a trial court may
disregard as a sham, failing to raise an issue of material
fact, an affidavit that contradicts a party's prior
deposition testimony, where the party has personal
knowledge of relevant facts and cannot explain a
material contradiction between deposition testimony
and a subsequent affidavit. 81
Since the Second Circuit's opinion in Perma, state
and federal courts have considered the sham affidavit
issue with a variety of results. For example, in
Rohrbaugh v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 82 the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the district court's disregard of an
expert's post-deposition affidavit, concluding:
Given the conflicts between Dr. Cox's affidavit
and his deposition testimony, the District Court
was left not with a genuine issue ofmaterial fact
but with trying to determine which of several
conflicting versions ofDr. Cox's testimony was
correct. (citations omitted). We hold that the
District Court was justified in disregarding the
affidavit. Without the affidavit Plaintiffs have not
met their burden to come forward with enough
evidence that a jury could find that Defendant's
vaccine probably caused Plaintiff's injuries. 83
State courts have rejected the rule more frequently
than have federal courts. 84 The Pittman opinion
exemplifies the chief criticism ofthe Perma rule: that its
application forces a court to assess credibility. Even the
dissent in Pittman expressed concern "that adopting that
approach would improperly allow the court, on summary

81

82

83

judgment, to resolve conflicting evidence and make
credibility assessments, which are matters for the trier of
fact to determine. " 85 When may a Maryland court, which
is considering summary judgment, strike an opposing
affidavit that contradicts or alters the affiant's prior
deposition testimony? Under Pittman, if the court
concludes that "a rational jury would reject as incredible"
the facts set forth in the affidavit, the court is authorized to
disregard the otherwise admissible content of the
affidavit. 86
One legal commentator has identified three
approaches, which he describes as "all wrong,"87 adopted
by courts in the treatment of post-deposition affidavits
submitted in opposition to summary judgment. 88 In the
first approach, all inconsistencies are deemed to generate
a fact question that should go to the jury. 89 Professor
Duane describes this approach as consistent with the
Supreme Court's repeated insistence that opposing
evidence must be believed. 90 The second approach, a
theoretical and functional opposite ofthe first, advocates
striking all contradictory affidavits on the policy grounds
(as enunciated in Perm a) of preserving the "utility" of
summary judgment.91 Finally, in the third or intermediate
approach, the judge draws a distinction "between
discrepancies which create transparent shams and
discrepancies which create an issue of credibility or go to

86

Id. at539, 754A.2dat 1044.

87

See J. J. Duane, The Four Greatest Myths About Summary
Judgment, 52WASH.&LEEL.REV 1523, 1596(1995).
88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id. at 1597.

91

Id.

Id. at529, 754A.2dat 1038.

916 F.2d 970,976 (4th Cir. 1990).
Id.
92

See Collin J. Cox, Reconsidering the Sham Affidavit
Doctrine, 50 DUKE L.J. 261,272-75 (2000).

Id. at 1598 (citing Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953
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the weight of the evidence."92
In Professor Duane's view, the court need not strike
an affidavit even if it appears to be a sham. 93 Rather, the
judge should pose "one simple question": "'Assuming that
all ofthe witnesses would testifY at trial just as they have in
their most recent affidavits, that they are cross-examined
about the allegedly inconsistent statements they made at
their depositions and that the jury hears the same
explanation I have been given (if any) about the variation,
is there any genuine possibility that the jury might find
in favor of the adverse party?"' 94 He offers this
approach as a "simple solution ... simple in
application, coherent, and correct." 95 Is Professor
Duane's proposal the analytical equivalent of
Maryland's test, i.e., whether the non-moving party
has presented such evidence upon which a jury could
reasonably find for the plaintiff?
B. Scheduling Orders vs. Summary Judgment:
Rules in Conflict?

After a lead paint case is filed, the circuit court issues
a scheduling order tailored to the proof requirements in
such cases. 96 In Pittman, the Plaintiffs had three years

94

/d.

95

!d.

from the date of the court's scheduling order to furnish
all information responsive to the Defendants' discovery
requests. 97 Atlantic argued that Plaintiffs violated the
scheduling order's discovery deadline by submitting a postdiscovery period affidavit that altered the facts Plaintiffs
had asserted in depositions. 98 Although Plaintiffs claimed
that they merely had supplemented and clarified their prior
discovery with the new affidavits,99 the new information
had substantive legal meaning for both sides. The
"supplementation" included an affidavit from Plaintiffs'
medical expert in which, based upon the newlyprovided information in the Plaintiffs' affidavits, the
expert opined that the length of time Terran either
resided at or visited Atlantic's property was sufficient
to constitute a "substantial factor" in causing his
injuries.
According to the court of appeals' analysis, neither
the rule governing scheduling orders nor the scheduling
order for a specific case deprives the non-moving party
ofthe right to submit an affidavit in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment. 100 Therefore, a trial court's
authority to strike affidavits that contradict prior deposition
testimony must be found in Rule 2-501. 101 Based upon
this analysis, the court relied upon the traditional rule that
prohibits trial courts from making credibility determinations
in ruling on motions for summary judgment.
However, the court's analysis does not explore in
detail the potential for conflict arising from the intetplay of
the summary judgment rule and the rule governing
scheduling orders as they are applied together. Rule 2504 mandates the issuance of a scheduling order in every

96

In Baltimore City, the standard scheduling order was
developed through the sustained efforts of Judge Ellen M.
Heller, in ongoing meetings with members of the "lead paint
Bar," representing the views of both plaintiffs and defendants
in these actions. The comprehensive nature of the orders is a
testament to Judge Heller's determination to assure that the
parties have every opportunity to prepare their cases.
97

359 Md. at 518, 754 A.2d at 1032. The scheduling order,
issued in March 1995, required that discovery be completed
by March 1996, and that further supplementation and expert
depositions be completed by March 1998. !d.
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!d. at533-34, 754A.2dat 1041.
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!d. at 526,754 A.2d at 1037.
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civil action and sets forth the required format of each
order. Practically speaking, this scheduling order is
the roadmap of the litigation. Under Rule 2-504, the
required contents of each order include assignment to
the appropriate scheduling category of a differentiated
case management system, as well as deadlines for
identification of experts, notification of computergenerated evidence, completion of discovery, and filing
of dispositive motions.
The language ofRule 2-504 expressly requires that
the scheduling order circumscribe the discovery period, 102
underscoring the indispensable role that discovery plays
in civillitigation. 103 Without reference to the discovery
deadline imposed by Rule 2-504, Rule 2-501 (b)
authorizes the filing of an affidavit in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment where the motion is
supported by affidavit or other statement under oath.
The Court of Appeals Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure ("the Rules Committee")
enacted all of the rules at issue here: the summary
judgment rule, the discovery rules, and the scheduling
order rule. The Rules Committee, like a legislature, is
presumed to know the law, including what rules it has
enacted. Nevertheless, when it enacted Rule 2-504, it
chose not to modify Rule 2-501 (b). For this reason, it
could be argued that the Committee intended to
preserve a party's right to submit new information in
opposition to summary judgment, even after the close
of discovery.
However, in construing court rules, the court reads
the rules so as to harmonize them and to avoid an

103 This role of the discovery rules was described by the Court
of Appeals in Baltimore Transit Co. v. Mezzanotti, 227 Md. 8,
174 A.2d 768 (1961): "One of their fundamental and principal
objectives is to require disclosure offacts by a party litigant to
all of his adversaries, and thereby to eliminate, as far as
possible, the necessity of any party to litigation going to trial in
a confused or muddled state of mind, concerning the facts that
gave rise to the litigation. (Emphasis in original). /d. at 13, 174
A.2dat771.

unintended or unreasonable result. 104 From the
language of Rule 1-201 (a), it is apparent that the Rules
Committee intended to create a system of judicial
administration that would promote procedural
simplicity and fairness in administration, and that
would eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay. The
scheduling order is an essential element of this system.
Certainly creation and implementation of the
scheduling order, including resolution of discovery
disputes, occupies a major portion of a court's
personnel and financial resources. Thus, the filing of
post-discovery affidavits such as were filed in Pittman,
that contradict information provided during the
discovery phase, severely limits the utility of the
scheduling order and discovery process. Such filing
undercuts the court's efforts to generate an appropriate
scheduling order. It wastes the time of judges hearing
motions on discovery disputes. It wastes the time of
counsel who, believing that all of the requested material
facts have been disclosed, are surprised in the summary
judgment phase to learn that they have not. Without a
change in the rules, a party may simply wait until
discovery closes and the opposing party moves for
summary judgment to "supplement or clarify" the facts
or to take seriously the obligation to furnish accurate
and full information.
There may be times when the ability to file a postdeposition affidavit may be necessary. For example, a
party may discover new evidence, or may have been under
a disability at the time of first deposition. Nevertheless,
such circumstances warrant some justification for deviating
from the scheduling order's deadline for completing and
supplementing discovery.
The Pittman Court outlines three measures "for
dealing with that which the court is convinced is a sham
affidavit." 105 These include sanctions under Rule 1-341,
but also include prosecution forpeijury. Third among these,
by authority of the "catchall" power of court under Rule

105

359 Md. at542, 754A.2dat 1045.

106

!d. at543, 754A.2dat 1046.
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SeeCurranv.Price,334Md.149, 172,638A.2d93, 105
(1994).
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2-504(b)(2)(G), the court "could sever the issue of
material fact involved in the contradictory statements
for trial as a separate issue, thus presumably sparing
the moving party the expense of a full trial. 106
Unfortunately these measures are neither swift nor
certain. Moreover, they further occupy the very time
and resources that summary judgment was intended
to preserve.
In these circumstances, discovery sanctions are not
efficacious because the court-ordered discovery phase has
closed. Time-consuming peijury prosecutions rely for their
success on the abilities of the local prosecutor to prove
the peijury beyond a reasonable doubt. Are these truly
meaningful remedies for a party who relied in good faith
upon the accuracy, and the truthfulness, ofthe other party's
discovery responses? Ultimately, the necessity ofenduring
the full course of the litigation may be so expensive
that a later-imposed sanction may not be a sufficient
remedy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Pittman was litigated pursuant to a scheduling order

that, in accordance with Rule 2-504, established precisely
the dates by which certain milestones, including completion
of all discovery, were to be reached. The conduct that
sparked the controversy leading to appeal was the
Plaintiffs' post-deposition affidavits, transforming their
claim from one that would most likely have been defeated
on summary judgment into one that, ultimately, has survived
to be presented to jury.
In determining whether there exists a genuine dispute
of material fact, trial courts often are faced with such
contradictory assertions made, without explanation, after
the close of discovery. Unless they meet the test set by
the court in Pittman - that a rational jury would reject
them as incredible -the moving party is forced to trial.
This is because there is no requirement to explain why
newly disclosed information was not disclosed earlier and,
otherwise, there is no authority for a trial court to evaluate
whether the assertions contained in an affidavit can be
viewed as "genuine." The interplay of Rules 2-401, 2501(b) and 2-504 presents a dilemma of breadth and
complexity that deserves thorough consideration by the
Rules Committee.
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